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Hierarchies in Action and Motor Control
Sebo Uithol, Iris van Rooij, Harold Bekkering, and Pim Haselager
Abstract
■ In analyses of the motor system, two hierarchies are often
posited: The first—the action hierarchy—is a decomposition
of an action into subactions and sub-subactions. The second—
the control hierarchy—is a postulated hierarchy in the neural
control processes that are supposed to bring about the action.
A general assumption in cognitive neuroscience is that these
two hierarchies are internally consistent and provide comple-
mentary descriptions of neuronal control processes. In this
article, we suggest that neither offers a complete explanation
and that they cannot be reconciled in a logical or conceptually
coherent way. Furthermore, neither pays proper attention to
the dynamics and temporal aspects of neural control pro-
cesses. We will explore an alternative hierarchical organization
in which causality is inherent in the dynamics over time. Spe-
cifically, high levels of the hierarchy encode more stable (goal-
related) representations, whereas lower levels represent more
transient (actions and motor acts) kinematics. If employed
properly, a hierarchy based on this latter principle of temporal
extension is not subject to the problems that plague the tradi-
tional accounts. ■
INTRODUCTION
In motor control, it is common to think of actions as hier-
archically structured: A goal is served by an action, which,
in turn, is served by multiple subactions. For example,
when I want a glass of milk from the fridge, I have to
get up from my chair, walk to the kitchen, open the door
of the fridge, grasp the box of milk, and so on. I get up by
means of placing my hands on the armrests, bending
forward, stretching my legs, and pushing off. I place my
hands on the armrest by means of stretching my arms,
grasping the rests, and so forth (similar to Newell & Simonʼs,
1972, means–end structure in problem solving; see also
Byrne & Russon, 1998). When the goal of getting a glass
of milk is placed on top, and the other aspects of the action
are arranged below it, a hierarchy appears. When going
down the hierarchy, the tree gets wider (more elements
on one level), although the elements become less abstract,
down to the level of individual muscle movements.
A general assumption of cognitive science is that such
action hierarchies are mirrored in the neural representation
underlying them (Botvinick, 2008; Bechtel & Richardson,
1993). In other words, there are two hierarchies: an action
hierarchy describing the action and a control hierarchy
describing the neural processes that are presumed to bring
the action about.1 Cognitive scientists assume, either im-
plicitly (Hamilton & Grafton, 2007) or explicitly (Botvinick,
2008), that these two hierarchies match. However, as
Badre notes: “The fact that a task can be represented hier-
archically does not require that the action system itself con-
sist of structurally distinct processes” (Badre, 2008, p. 193);
so, this assumption should be subject to testing. But,
whether these two hierarchies are identical is only partly
an empirical matter. Before experiments to test this as-
sumption can be designed, some important conceptual
issues need to be addressed.
There are multiple ways to construct a hierarchy, but
two hierarchical structures seem prevalent in the litera-
ture on action and motor control: One is a hierarchy
based on constitutional or part–whole relations between
the elements; the other is structured around a causal
influence between the elements. When describing the
action hierarchy, typically, a part–whole structure is pre-
sumed, whereas the control hierarchy is usually explained
using a causal framework. However, we will show that
these two structuring principles are in fact mutually exclu-
sive, which suggests that the action hierarchy need not be
similar to the control hierarchy. We will discuss empirical
evidence that these two hierarchies are indeed dissimilar.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
We will start by briefly elucidating the relation between
actions and goals. Next, we will discuss the two main
structuring principles of hierarchies in the motor domain
and argue that they are incompatible and dissimilar. As an
alternative account, we will discuss models that use dif-
ferent time scales for different control processes. In these
models, structures can be found that can be seen as hier-
archically structured but in a different and much more
implicit form. This interpretation of a hierarchy is not
subject to the problems that plague the first two options
and might therefore be an interesting alternative for struc-
turing elements in motor control. Understanding the na-
ture of this hierarchical structure can guide empirical
research into action control.Radboud University Nijmegen
© 2012 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 24:5, pp. 1077–1086
ACTIONS AND GOALS
The topmost level of a hierarchy in the motor domain is
often labeled the “goal level” (Hamilton & Grafton, 2006),
“desire level” (Grafton & Hamilton, 2007; Hamilton &
Grafton, 2007), or “intention level” (Pezzulo, Butz, &
Castelfranchi, 2008), but other labels, such as “super-
ordinate action,” can be found as well (Humphreys &
Forde, 1998). Below that, there is usually at least one level
for “actions” (Hamilton & Grafton, 2006) or “subgoals”
(Hamilton, 2009), and the bottom level is often labeled
“movements” or “kinematics.” The exact labels of these
levels may, of course, vary, as long as confusion is pre-
vented. For reasons of clarity and consistency, we will call
the elements on the highest level “goals,” the action fea-
tures on lower levels “actions,” and the elements on the
lowest level “motor acts,”2 as can be seen in Figure 1.
The idea of a hierarchical structure in actions has been
applied both to action execution and action observation
or action understanding. The rationale behind this dual
application is that there is evidence that the same brain
structures are used for action generation and action ob-
servation (see the extensive body of literature on mirror
neurons: Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010; Rizzolatti & Craighero,
2004; motor resonance: Uithol, van Rooij, Bekkering, &
Haselager, 2011a; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti,
1995). Our analysis, however, is based mainly on claims
about hierarchies in the execution of an action but might
have consequences for action observation as well.
To get a better understanding of what is actually claimed
when it is proposed that action production is structured
hierarchically, it is useful to formulate an answer to two
questions: (1) What makes one level higher than another
(what is the variable on the vertical axis), and (2) what is
the relation between features on different levels (what do
the lines between the hierarchy elements in Figure 1
portray)? By answering these two questions, we will be
able to compare the two different accounts of hierarchical
structures in the motor domain.
PART–WHOLE RELATIONS
We can interpret a hierarchy as portraying part–whole
relations between the elements. Each level of the hierar-
chy comprises a set of subsystems, which are themselves
composed of smaller units. For example, the action of
“getting milk” consists of “walking to the fridge,” “opening
the door,” “grasping the box of milk,” and so on. “Opening
the fridge,” in turn, consists of “grasping the handle,”
“pulling,” and so on (see Figure 2 for an example of a
part–whole hierarchy). In such a hierarchy, “getting milk”
does not exist apart from “walking to the fridge,” “opening
the fridge,” and so forth; it is composed of these action
features. In other words, when there is the right kind of
reaching and opening and closing of the hand (and a milk
box, of course), there is “grasping of the box of milk.” Like-
wise, when all the actions in the hierarchy are present, the
goal of “getting milk” is present. In this case, the vertical
axis denotes constitutive complexity. The higher up the
axis, the more subparts in total a certain action element
has. The lines in Figure 2 portray a “part of” relation.
Some important points need to be made in respect to
a hierarchy based on a part–whole relationship between
the elements. First, this hierarchy can be postulated inde-
pendently of an underlying cognitive mechanism. It is a
description of an action and a way of carving an action into
smaller subactions and sub-subactions. The lower the hier-
archical level, the more detailed the description is; the
Figure 1. A typical action hierarchy with one goal level and multiple
levels for actions and motor acts. Note that this hierarchy is far from
complete; for every action, only a few subactions are shown.
Figure 2. A hierarchy, again simplified, structured according to the
part–whole principle. The structure is practically identical to the
hierarchies found in the literature on action representation
(see Figure 1).
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higher the level, the more encompassing the element
is. “Grasp handle” is just a label for the combination of
“reach toward handle” and “full hand grip.” As such, it
provides a description of the explanandum, not an
explanation. Similarly, one can describe a human being
as consisting a trunk, a head, two legs, and two arms.
The head consists of eyes, ears, a nose, a mouth, and so
forth. This description does not directly offer a mechan-
ical explanation of the functioning of the human body; it
describes the elements that need to be explained. This
nature becomes evident when one tries to imagine
how the postulated hierarchy could be refuted. It is hard
to imagine empirical evidence that could show that
“reaching” appears not to be a part of “grasping the milk
box.” It seems that the kind of evidence that could refute
this hierarchy would rather be conceptual in nature.
Next, the part–whole hierarchy does not allow causal
influence between the elements, as that would mean that
an element would be the cause of its own parts, and, in
general, nothing can be the cause of its own parts (Craver
& Bechtel, 2007; Lewis, 2000).3 Likewise, the head is not
the cause of the eyes or nose. In terms of actions, this
means that the reaching action cannot be the cause of
the full hand grip but, also, that the goal of getting milk
cannot be the cause of walking to the kitchen, which is at
odd with most studies into goal-directed action. This sug-
gests that the part–whole principle might not be the only
principle at work in the general perception of a hierarchy
in the motor domain.
Lastly, we have previously shown (Uithol et al., 2011a)
that goals can be formulated as an action of a more ab-
stract form (grasping a cup serves the goal drinking), a de-
sired world state (grasping the cup to have a clean table),
or an object (the cup is the goal of my grasping action). It
is possible to construct a part–whole hierarchy only when
goals, actions, and motor acts are of a similar nature, in
this case, a type of action. Only goals formulated as a type
of action have subparts that can be accommodated in
a hierarchy. When goals are rendered as desired world
states or objects, no relevant subparts of an action goal
can be formulated and placed in a hierarchy. Objects of
course have subparts (a cup has a handle, a saucer,
etc.), but object parts have no place in an action hierar-
chy, as actions cannot be subparts of an object. The same
goes for a desired world state: It has many (dissimilar)
elements, such as objects and relations or properties,
but they cannot be arranged in an action hierarchy. A
part–whole hierarchy could be construed for a desired
world state, but it would describe the world state, not
the action needed to bring it about.
In summary, a hierarchy strictly based on a part–whole
principle describes the action and its structure. No causal
influence can be assumed between the different ele-
ments in the hierarchy. Consequently, a hierarchy strictly
based on a part–whole principle may provide a character-
ization of an action but does not provide an explanation
of actions or motor control. Also, a hierarchy of this type
allows only one interpretation of a goal, namely, a goal
formulated as an action of a higher abstraction.
CAUSAL RELATIONS
An alternative principle to structure a hierarchy in the mo-
tor domain, not based on part–whole relations, is a causal
hierarchy in which parts higher on the hierarchy are the
cause of, or causally influence, parts lower on the hierar-
chy.4 The goal of getting a glass of milk activates a “get up”
action, which activates a “stretch legs” and “bend trunk”
action. In a causal hierarchy, higher-level elements can
modulate the activity of lower-level mechanisms.
This structure differs from the part–whole structure in
four important ways. First, the action features are not sub-
parts of features higher up the hierarchy but necessarily
exist independently of action elements higher in the hier-
archy. It is important to realize that this renders the part–
whole hierarchy and the causal hierarchy incompatible. In
the part–whole hierarchy, the higher elements consist of
the lower elements and, therefore, by definition, do not
exist independently. In the causal hierarchy, the causal
influence between the elements necessitates indepen-
dent existence of the various elements.
Second, when goals exist independently of actions, it
is no longer necessary that elements higher in the causal
hierarchy are more complex than elements lower in the
hierarchy. A simple element can just as well be the cause
of a complex element. Indeed, goals and intentions are
often posited to be discrete, constitutionally simple and
propositional states (Pacherie, 2008; Haggard, 2005; see
also Uithol, Burnston, & Haselager, submitted).
Third, possible interpretations of the notion of goals
are no longer restricted to abstract action type of goals.
The fact that parts need to be of a similar (ontological)
nature as the whole entails that a part–whole hierarchy
only allowed goals defined in terms of an action. This re-
striction drops out in a causal hierarchy so that goals for-
mulated as a desired world state or an object can also be
the cause of an action. Additionally, elements such as
“affordances” (Gibson, 1977)—being a relation between
an organism and an object—can now be accommodated.
Fourth, unlike the part–whole relation, the causal
structuring principle does make claims about the under-
lying cognitive mechanisms. Effects and causes are
assigned to different elements, and for these elements to
have a physical reality, they must be assumed to be related
to physical causes and effects, for instance, such as those
that may hold in the brain.
To illustrate the nature of this hierarchy, let us assume
that the goal of “getting milk” is the cause of “walking to
the kitchen,” “opening the fridge,” and “grasping the
milk.” When we want to add further detail to this hierar-
chy, for example, by further specifying “open fridge” into
“full hand grip” and “pull,” we have to choose between
simply replacing the element “open fridge” with this se-
quence of elements (Figure 3A) and adding an extra layer
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below “open fridge” (Figure 3B). The difference is not a
mere difference in visualization but actually corresponds
to two different claims about the control of the action. In
the latter situation, we postulate an extra control layer,
which is ontologically independent of “full hand grasp”
and “pull handle.” In this case, it is claimed that “opening
the fridge” exists as a separate entity (a representation or
a command), independent of the lower-level features.
In the causal hierarchy, the vertical axis denotes causal
influence. Higher levels have causal influence on lower
levels, but lower levels have no influence on higher levels.
However, motor control is generally not believed to be in-
stantiated by unidirectional downward causation. More
realistic models of motor control implement feedback
by means of reciprocal connections (Kilner, Friston, &
Frith, 2007) and feedforward and error predictions (Friston,
2005; Haruno, Wolpert, & Kawato, 2001).
However, feedback between action elements on differ-
ent levels is problematic to accommodate in a hierarchy
structured around causal influence, as feedback is also a
form of causal influence. If motor acts can also influence
actions, and actions also influence goals, we seem to have
lost the principled reason for placing goals on top and
means at the bottom of the hierarchy. In other words,
there seem to be no principles for placing one level below
or above another level, which means a departure from
one of the main characteristics of the control hierarchy:
its top–down organization.
To make things causally even more complex and inter-
connected, in addition to the aforementioned interlevel
causal influence, there is evidence for intralevel causal
influence as well: Elements on a given level seem to influ-
ence each other. As an example, Cohen and Rosenbaum
(2004) show a “hysterese effect.” This effect shows that,
during a grasping task, a previous grip location influences
the location where an object is grasped next, even when
this means that the well-known “end state comfort” prin-
ciple (Rosenbaum & Jorgensen, 1992)—a presumable
top–down process—has to be violated. As another exam-
ple, Selen, Franklin, and Wolpert (2009) found that the
“stiffness” used in pushing an object was not only an effect
of the characteristics of the object that was being pushed
but also of the previous object. In other words, it mat-
tered what the participant did before for how the task
was executed.
There is also evidence that what you will do next influ-
ences on how you perform the current action or motor act.
In speech articulation, this effect is known as “coarticula-
tion” (Rosenbaum, 2009). When, for example, pronounc-
ing “tulip,” the lips already round before pronouncing
the “t” to correctly pronounce the “u,” but consequently,
the “t” is pronounced slightly different.
When there seems to be mutual influence between
elements on different levels as well as between elements
on a single level, and we hold on to causality as the only
principle for structuring the hierarchy, the image that
emerges is more like a mesh with dynamically inter-
connected action features than a neat tree structure with
an inherent top–down ordering of levels. In a tree with
bidirectional causal influence, no unambiguous ordering
of levels is implied by the causal relation alone.
To be clear, the conclusion of our analysis is not that
the idea of a control hierarchy is in itself wrong. We have
argued that, if such a hierarchy exists, then, it cannot
be based on causal relations alone. Likewise, we do not
wish to deny the existence of causal relations between
the action elements, but framing the hierarchy entirely
in terms of causal influence just does not seem to capture
the complexity of influences present in the neural control
of an action.
Still, we, as well as many other species, are capable of
organizing our behavior in such ways that a predetermined
goal is achieved. When I want a glass of milk, I usually have
this goal before initiating action. Also, I usually succeed,
regardless of a few obstacles on my path, and when neces-
sary, I can adapt my behavior to unforeseen environmental
demands and still succeed. This must mean that the goal of
getting a glass of milk in Figure 3 has a dominance of some
sort over the other action features. A clue on how this dom-
inance could be achieved can be found in recent modeling
work. We will discuss this in the Temporal Extension sec-
tion. First, we will formulate the consequences of the
Figure 3. Two different
hierarchies structured
according to the causal
principle. In hierarchy
(A) there is no extra control
layer between “getting
a glass of milk” and
“full-hand grasp,” whereas
in (B) “open fridge”
exists as an independent
causal unit.
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incompatibility explained above for cognitive research into
motor control.
DIFFERENT HIERARCHIES FOR DIFFERENT
PARTS OF THE EXPLANATION
Both the part–whole structure and the causal structure
can be found in the literature on action representation
and motor control. For example, Grafton and Hamilton
(2007) provide much evidence for a form of distributed
representation of an action in which different action ele-
ments are represented in different brain regions. They
claim that this distributed nature of action representation
provides evidence for a hierarchy in motor control. They
note that “control hierarchies should be reflected by dif-
ferences in those areas that are recruited for preparation
and execution” (p. 599), suggesting a causal influence be-
tween the various elements. Later, however, they postulate
an action hierarchy based on levels of complexity (p. 605),
suggesting a part–whole structure.
In general, each of the hierarchies seems to have
found its own niche within explanations of an action.
When describing the action hierarchy, a hierarchy is
often constructed on basis of the part–whole structure.
The action is carved into subactions and sub-subactions,
as explained above. On the other hand, when the control
hierarchy is described, a causal structure is presumed.
An overview of our conclusions thus far is presented in
Table 1.
We have argued that the two structuring principles are
not compatible. So, when the action hierarchy is sup-
posed to be mirrored in the control hierarchy, a structur-
ing principle that is applicable to both the hierarchies is
needed. Unfortunately, neither the part–whole structure
nor the causal structure seems to thrive outside its niche.
The causal structure makes little sense in the action
hierarchy. We might be able to explain that my walking
to the fridge is caused by the goal of getting milk, but
it does not make sense to state that my leg swinging is
caused by my walking, as that would entail that my walk-
ing could exist independently of leg swinging.
Applying a part–whole structure to a control hierarchy
is equally problematic. First, as explained above, a part–
whole hierarchy would not relate to a causal mechanism
but to a (complex) representation of an action at best.
Second, when one is looking for a part–whole hierarchy
in neural structures, one assumes that the structure in
the content of the representation is mirrored in the struc-
ture of the vehicle of the representation, which means
that one is looking for an action representation with a
constituent structure (Fodor, 1975) or a microfeature
structure (van Gelder, 1999). In this form of representa-
tion, the vehicle (i.e., the neural state that carries the in-
formation) has identifiable subparts, and content can be
attributed to these subparts. Moreover, the content of
the overall representation is dependent on the content
of the subparts. So, in case of action representation,
the goal representation should consist of subrepresenta-
tions that can be identified as actions. These subrepre-
sentation again have subparts with identifiable content.
For example, the representation of grasping the handle
should consist of two identifiable representations: reach-
ing toward the handle and a full hand grip. This strong
restriction renders much of the available neural data in-
sufficient to support a part–whole hierarchy, as not only
do we have to find different representations for different
subparts of an action, but these representation together
also need to be correlated with the presence of a goal.
So, for example, goal-sensitive mirror neurons in the
macaqueʼs premotor cortex (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, &
Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi,
1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1987) cannot be accommodated
in a control hierarchy based on a part–whole relation.
The vehicle of this goal representation is simple in the
sense that no functional subparts are known to date5
(Uithol, van Rooij, Bekkering, & Haselager, 2011b).
In all, the two structures are not compatible, and
neither structure is transferable to the other side of the
explanation. A direct consequence is that the control
hierarchy and the action hierarchy need not match. Both
the structure and set of elements of the two hierarchies
can differ. Apparently, our intuition to divide an action
into even smaller parts—our “folk motor control,” so to
speak—might not be the best strategy for finding the
neural correlates of action control.6 Indeed, Dennett
warns us against the uncritical acceptance of a seemingly
(intuitively) reasonable task description: “Marrʼs more
telling strategic point is that, if you have a seriously mis-
taken view about what the computational level descrip-
tion of your system is …, your attempts to theorize at
lower levels will be confounded by spurious artifactual
puzzles. What Marr underestimates, however, is the ex-
tent to which computational level (or intentional stance)
descriptions can also mislead the theorist who forgets
just how idealized they are” (Dennett, 1989, p. 108). In-
stead, a constant interplay between gathering neural data
and adapting the action hierarchy might be a more fruit-
ful strategy.
Thus far, we have based our conclusion that the action
hierarchy need not match the control hierarchy solely on
conceptual grounds. In the next section, we will discuss
Table 1. The Two Types of Hierarchies and Their Properties
Action Hierarchy Control Hierarchy
Structuring
principle
Part–Whole Causality
Location In the nervous system In the action
Nature Decomposition of
explanandum
Mechanism
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empirical evidence that there are in fact dissimilarities
between these two hierarchies.
NEURAL EVIDENCE FOR TWO
DIFFERENT HIERARCHIES
There are two ways in which the action hierarchy and the
control hierarchy can be dissimilar: The control hierarchy
can contain elements that are absent in the action hier-
archy, and, vice versa, the action hierarchy can contain
elements that are absent in the control hierarchy. There
seems to be empirical evidence for both types of mis-
matches. To give an example of the first, Graziano and
Aflalo (2007) stimulated the premotor areas of macaque
monkeys for a relatively long duration (500–1000 msec).
They were thereby able to evoke complex movement
sequences to a certain end location, for instance, a se-
quence consisting of grasping, bringing to the mouth,
turning the head toward the hand, and opening the
mouth. Importantly, these movements were complex
but “dumb”: When something blocked the trajectory of
the bringing-to-the-mouth movement, the arm got stuck
and did no move (Graziano, 2010, p. 461). These data
seem to suggest that the behavioral repertoire of the
monkey is represented by means of basic chunks and
modifications to these chunks, such as target localization
and adaptation to the trajectory when an object is block-
ing the pathway. However, a straightforward decomposi-
tion of the action into an action hierarchy would not
automatically lead to these basic action chunks and,
therefore, would not posit the additional modifying ele-
ments. This demonstrates that the control hierarchy con-
tains elements that are absent in a straightforward action
hierarchy.
Similarly, the most straightforward or intuitive decom-
position of a grasping action is into the movements of
individual fingers and the thumb. However, there is evi-
dence that, at the neural side, the control of the grip is
not decomposed into the movements of individual fin-
gers but to a base posture with addition of refinements
in finger and thumb position (Mason, Gomez, & Ebner,
2001). So, a straightforward decomposition of a precision
grip grasping action would lead to an index finger and
thumb movements as basic chunks, whereas the neural
control hierarchy has a full hand grasp and suppression
of three fingers as basic chunks. Again, our “folk” de-
composition of an action seems not to correspond to
the control hierarchy: The neural representation can
contain elements that, at first sight, do not seem to be part
of the action.
There seems to be neurological evidence for the oppo-
site possibility as well: The control hierarchy can lack ele-
ments that do seem to be part of the action hierarchy.
The literature on embodied,7 embedded cognition pro-
vides many examples of elements that can be considered
part of an action but lack a neural correlate (see, for in-
stance, Chiel & Beer, 1997). Clear examples can be found
in the human gait. Our gait is a complex orchestra of
movements in many joints. The muscle activation re-
sponsible for a successful gait is hypothesized to be con-
trolled by central pattern generators (Duysens & Van de
Crommert, 1998). However, these neural patterns are not
sufficient to generate a fluent and efficient gate. Passive
components, such as muscle and tendon elasticity and
inertia of the upper and lower leg, are of crucial impor-
tance (Whittington, Silder, Heiderscheit, & Thelen, 2008).
In other words, some particular stages or parts of an
action are not controlled by the neural patterns that ac-
tivate muscles, but these stages are accomplished by
“exploiting” regularities of the body, such as muscle and
tendon elasticity, and the context, such as inertia and
gravity, and are, in that sense, not centrally controlled
but via self-organization. These important features of a
normal gate are not part of the action representation
but are, nevertheless, part of the action.
The problems outlined above suggest that, in their
purest form, the two traditional principles for structuring
a hierarchy might neither separately nor combined be the
best candidates for a general theory on action representa-
tion. An interesting alternative for (or modification to)
structuring the control hierarchy can be found in the
temporal ordering of hierarchical elements or processes
(Kiebel, Daunizeau, & Friston, 2008; Koechlin, Ody, &
Kouneiher, 2003; Kelso, 1995). The fundamentals of such
a hierarchy are best introduced by discussing a recent
model in robotics (Yamashita & Tani, 2008). After this
brief excursion, we will return to neuroscience and discuss
Koechlinʼs “cascade model” of neural control (Koechlin
et al., 2003) that seems to be structured around the same
principle.
TEMPORAL EXTENSION
Yamashita and Tani (2008) modeled a motor system of a
robot without using what they call “local representa-
tions”: neural nodes dedicated to the representation of
single action primitives in an explicitly represented hierar-
chical structure. Every 1 of the 180 units was connected
to every other unit, including itself. The network was trained
using backpropagation. They realized self-organization of a
functional hierarchy through the use of two distinct types
of neurons, each with different temporal properties. The
first type of neuron was fast in the sense that its activity
can change quickly. The second type of neuron was slow.
They found that, after training, continuous sensorimotor
flows are segmented into reusable motor primitives during
repetitive execution of behavioral tasks. Moreover, these
primitives could be flexibly integrated into new behavioral
sequences. The model accomplishes this without setting
up an explicit subgoal or function. In other words, without
explicit instructions, representations of independent action
elements emerge.
It is important for our analysis that the two types of neu-
rons each developed a distinct activation profile. During
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the execution of a repetitive motor task, repetitions of
similar patterns were observed in activities of the fast con-
text units. The activity in the slow units, in contrast, re-
mained constant throughout the repetitious task. These
results can be interpreted such that the fast units encoded
reusable motor primitives that, because of their fast
dynamics, were unable to preserve goal information over
long trajectories. The slow context units, in contrast,
encoded the switching between these primitives and,
on account of their slow dynamics, could contribute to
more stable goal representations. It is important to realize
that the behavior of the robot was the result of the inter-
play of the different units and not of the slow units con-
trolling the faster ones.
This interpretation could provide us another and less
problematic structuring principle for a hierarchy: temporal
extension. Elements higher on the hierarchy are repre-
sented longer or are more stable than lower ones. As such,
they are able to influence an action for a longer time inter-
val, thereby accounting for our capacity to structure be-
havior around a goal. In a way, this reverses the general
reasoning: Elements are not more influential because they
are higher in the hierarchy, but elements are higher in the
hierarchy because they havemore influence (on account of
being more persistent).
Although it is related to causal influence, temporal ex-
tension is a different criterion for building a hierarchy. It
is not assumed that the causal influence works in only
one direction from goal to action—remember that every
unit in the network Yamashita & Tani used was con-
nected to every other unit. Nor is it assumed that the causal
influence in one direction is bigger than in the reversed
directed. The difference between the types of influence
is a difference in temporal extension: Goals simply exert
their influence longer than the actions or motor acts.
The control hierarchy structured on the basis of tem-
poral extension is not committed to the direct causal in-
fluences as found in the causal hierarchy. This means
that, although the overall structure—goals high in the
hierarchy and action means low in the hierarchy—can
be preserved, the hierarchy is much more implicit, as
the orderly tree structure is lost. There is a simultaneous
influence of a great many action features at an unbound
number of levels.
The model built by Yamashita and Tani (2008) devel-
oped a functional hierarchy of only two layers, slow and
fast, and the functional elements they found would still be
located at the very bottom of the common action hierar-
chies. They suggest that “[t]he idea of functional hierar-
chy that self-organizes through multiple time scales may
as such contribute to providing an explanation for puz-
zling observations of functional hierarchy in the absence
of an anatomical hierarchical structure” (p. 13). Indeed,
human action control seems to be hierarchically struc-
tured, as argued above, without a clear anatomical
hierarchical structure (Miller & Cohen, 2001), so this rel-
atively simple model illustrates a possible neural sub-
strate of an influential neurocognitive model on action
control.
Koechlin, Basso, Pietrini, Panzer, and Grafman (1999)
proposed a model in which different types of action con-
trol are located along a rostro-caudal axis in the lateral
pFC. In their hierarchical model, four types of control
are discerned (Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Koechlin
et al., 2003). Sensory control, located at the caudal end of
the axis, is involved in selecting motor actions. A bit more
anterior, contextual control is involved in selecting pre-
motor representations or stimulus–response associations.
Next, episodic control is involved in selecting task sets or
sets of consistent stimulus–response associations in the
same context. Lastly, branching control, implemented in
the rostral end of the axis (the anterior and frontopolar
regions of pFC), involves controlling the activation of
subepisodes nested in ongoing behavioral episodes.
The significance of the proposed model does not lie in
the fact that exactly four different control layers are posited
(it is, we believe, unlikely that human action control con-
sists of fixed and integer number of control layers) but in
the suggestion that different control processes operate on
different time scales. When going from sensory control to
branching control, the temporal extension of the types of
control grows. Sensory control deals with selecting im-
mediate movements—analogous to Yamashita and Taniʼs
fast neurons—andmonitoring stimulus changes. The input
to contextual control is already less transient. Episodic
control deals with entire sets of association within one con-
text, whereas branching control is involved in managing
changes between different contexts. This means that these
control processes can be accommodated in a hierarchy
structured around stability or temporal extension.
Once this hierarchy is established, it is compelling to
interpret Koechlin et al.ʼs finding in terms of a more tradi-
tional, causal control hierarchy, with an action goal originat-
ing in the higher control processes that is subsequently
propagated to the lower types of control to evoke the
appropriate action. By referring to their model as the
“cascademodel” and by emphasizing the downwardmodu-
lation, Koechlin and colleagues are (perhaps unintentionally)
feeding this compelling intuition, which is subsequently
adopted by other researchers (Hamilton, 2009; Badre &
DʼEsposito, 2007).
However, the data do not support such an interpreta-
tion. Koechlin et al. (1999) show that, when more tempo-
rally extended forms of control are needed, anterior and
frontopolar areas are activated in addition, not alterna-
tively, suggesting that these control processes are not re-
sponsible for the control task by themselves but through
interaction with the lower types of control, just like how
all the units in Yamashita and Taniʼs (2008) model con-
tributed to the resulting behavior. This collective contri-
bution is incompatible with the idea that goal-directed
behavior is the result of higher layers propagating goal
representations to lower layers. Goal-directed behavior
emerges from the interaction between the different
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types of processes, not from straightforward top–down
modulation.
If we were to accept Koechlinʼs alternative hierarchy
based on temporal extension but continued to interpret
this control hierarchy as a top–down causal structure, we
would not do justice to the complexity seemingly inher-
ent in action control. The dynamic interaction between
the various processes operating on different time scales
is not captured by straightforward top–down causation.
Additionally, interpreting the proposed hierarchy in
terms of causal effects entails positing functionally dis-
crete states that, through interaction, bring the action
about. As extensively argued by Uithol et al. (submitted),
such states seem inconsistent with existing data on action
control, as well as conceptually incoherent, to propose
that functionally discrete states with such causal effects
lie at the basis of our actions. The informationally and
dynamically complex control processes in the pFC are
irreconcilable with the idea that discrete states are the
primary cause of our action.
This insight could guide future research into action
control. Instead of positing an anteriorly represented
action goal and trying to locate the processes by which
this representation is transformed to a motor program,
the analysis above suggests that research into action con-
trol is better served by focusing on how goal-directed be-
havior emerges from the interaction between the different
control layers. Which sensory input is used at which layer of
control? How do lower control processes shape higher
ones, and vice versa? Koechlin and colleagues made an
important step in shifting this focus. This shift is hampered,
however, if we allow the traditional views back in to shape
our analysis.
An important theoretical advantage of an implicit hier-
archy based on temporal extension is that it rids us from
the rather artificial constraint that an action is associated
with just one goal, present in both the causal and part–
whole hierarchies. At every moment, one can be attri-
buted many, maybe even an infinite number of, goals:
to breathe, to read, to maintain homeostasis, to be a good
scientist, to remain an upright posture, and so forth.
Our behavior is the result of the interplay of this multi-
tude of goals (McFarland, 1989; see also Uithol et al., sub-
mitted). These goals need not be represented on the
higher layers in Koechlinʼs model but can also be an emer-
gent result of the interaction of different control pro-
cesses. To give a simple example, when swimming using
a front crawl, a typical pattern of strokes and breathing is
adopted. This pattern only makes sense when one real-
izes that two goals, to swim as fast as possible and to
breath, are pursued at the same time. Of course, we know
about a swimmerʼs goal to breathe, and this goal is un-
likely to be represented in one of Koechlinʼs control
layers. In straightforward cognitive descriptions, we are
inclined to leave it “out of the equation” and treat it as a
boundary condition. But making a distinction between
variables and boundary conditions in such an intuitive
and implicit manner might not be the best approach to
a general theory on motor control. Although cognitive
scientists generally have good reasons not to put an infi-
nite number of goals in a model on action representation,
to assume that the number of goals is always limited to
only one might, in some cases, be overly restrictive.
This influence of multiple simultaneous goals cannot
be easily accommodated in an explicit control hierarchy.
An element can be caused or modulated by multiple
goals at the same time. It might not always be clear what
goals influence a lower element or to what extent. The
result would be that the orderly tree-shaped hierarchy
gets replaced by a dense mesh of interconnected action
elements, which would seriously undermine the value of
a hierarchy in explaining the realization of actions.
On the other hand, the more implicit hierarchy struc-
tured around is not committed to the postulation of a
single, explicit goal nor a direct and univocal relation be-
tween the higher and lower elements. Therefore, the
influence of multiple simultaneous goals does not under-
mine the hierarchical structure.
CONCLUSION
In theories on motor control, two hierarchies, the action
hierarchy and the control hierarchy, are thought to
match. We have presented both conceptual and empir-
ical evidence suggesting that this assumption is unlikely
to be true. We have shown that, implicitly, two structur-
ing principles are used to construct a hierarchy but that
neither structure (nor the [impossible] combination of
the two structures) can provide an adequate framework
for explaining actions and motor control. The action hier-
archy, constructed using a part–whole hierarchy, is a de-
scription of the action that is to be explained but can be
misleading in searching for a neural implementation of
the action. The control hierarchy, constructed using
causal relations, does not capture the complexity inherent
in motor control. Our conclusion is not that motor control
is not structured hierarchically at all but that the tradi-
tional accounts of an action hierarchy do not capture
the complex and dynamic nature of motor control. Alter-
natively, dynamic accounts of motor control can be inter-
preted as hierarchical as well. In these models, elements
that are represented longer and more stable are higher in
the hierarchy. Although these alternative models are hier-
archical in a much more implicit way and cannot straight-
forwardly be interpreted along the same lines of the
more traditional accounts, they do not suffer from the
conceptual and empirical issues discussed. Much work,
both conceptual and empirical, is still needed to develop
an implicit hierarchical structure around temporal exten-
sion to an insightful and coherent alternative to the current
theories on action representation. Only if we approach
the alternative hierarchy as a genuinely alternative struc-
ture and avoid straightforward causal interpretations based
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on the traditional accounts, however, we can expect to find
its true value.
Acknowledgments
We thank Dan Burnston and Emily Cross for constructive com-
ments on an earlier draft of this article. This work was supported
by a Donders internal graduation grant to H. B. and P. M.,
an NWO-VICI grant to H. B., and the EU-Project Joint Action
Science and Technology (IST-FP6-003747).
Reprint requests should be sent to Sebo Uithol, Donders Insti-
tute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University
Nijmegen, PO Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands,
or via e-mail: S.Uithol@donders.ru.nl.
Notes
1. To prevent confusion: In the literature on motor control,
the notion “action hierarchy” is used for a hierarchical structure
both in the action and in the neural control of the action. Here,
we reserve the term for a hierarchical structure in the action or
the behavior. Posited structures in the neural control of an
action will be called “control hierarchy.”
2. When the ideomotor terminology is adopted, an action is a
movement that serves a goal (Arbib & Rizzolatti, 1997). The ele-
ments in a hierarchy serve a goal by definition (otherwise, they
could not be accommodated in the hierarchy), so the elements
on the lowest level cannot be “mere” movements (i.e., not serv-
ing a goal), as they are sometimes referred to. Hence, we choose
the term “motor act.”
3. Circular causality is a much debated concept within the
dynamical system theory (Bakker, 2005; Lewis, 2005; Juarrero,
1999; Kelso, 1995; Port & van Gelder, 1995; Haken, Kelso, &
Bunz, 1985) and means that elements on a lower level collec-
tively contribute to a higher-level variable, which in turn mod-
ulates the behavior of elements at the lower level. As it is still
highly contentious whether the downward causation (required
for genuine circular causality) actually amounts to a causative
force over and beyond the collective interactions of lower-level
elements (Kim, 1993, 2000), we do not wish to pursue this issue
here. More importantly, for our purposes, even if downward
causation in this strong sense would exist, the claim still is
not that the collective variable would actually cause its own
parts (i.e., their existence as parts) but, instead, that it would
causally constrain their behavior and would therefore fall under
the second principle to structure a hierarchy (see below).
4. Although this is generally true for action hierarchies, in the
perceptual hierarchy, the order is reversed: Features low in the
hierarchy, such as lines and colors, are thought to be the cause
of higher-level features, such as objects (Felleman & Van Essen,
1991; Hubel & Wiesel, 1959).
5. Features such as spiking frequency or phase could play a
functional role in the representational capacities of a neuron.
To our knowledge, no study investigated these properties of
mirror neurons.
6. The fact that the action hierarchy might not map (perfectly)
onto the control hierarchy also has interesting consequences
for theories on action understanding by means of motor
resonance or mirror neurons. In these theories, it is assumed
that, when observing action, the same neural structures are
recruited as when executing an action (Uithol et al., 2011a). But
when the features of action control do not match the action
features we distinguish in an observed action, the nature of
the “shared representations” (de Vignemont & Haggard,
2008) needs to be subjected to further research.
7. The notion of “embodiment” is used for various forms of
dependency on a body. In cognitive science, it can refer to
something as modest as the activation of the motor cortex (de
Vignemont & Haggard, 2008), whereas usually in philosophy, a
more radical mutual dependency between body and brain in
the generation of behavior is meant (Haselager, van Dijk, &
van Rooij, 2008; van Dijk, Kerkhofs, van Rooij, & Haselager,
2008; Clark, 1997; see Ziemke & Kirsh, 2003, for an overview
of the various interpretations). Here, we use the more radical
interpretation.
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